II. BaCkground
This comment argues the constitutionality of the Wyoming Firearms Freedom Act according to current federal jurisprudence and a historical analysis of state sovereignty under the Tenth Amendment.
12 It also asserts Wyoming should politically interpose between the federal government and Wyoming citizens. 13 An analysis of the constitutionality and practicality of the Act first requires a background exposition of how the Act conflicts with existing federal statutory law.
14 Second, an explanation of the doctrines of interposition and nullification is necessary to understand Wyoming's political options for asserting its sovereignty. 15 Third, an exposition of the historical development and meaning of the Tenth Amendment will help the reader understand how Wyoming should use this historical meaning in its political and legal arguments. 16 Fourth, this section addresses current federal jurisprudence in the area of state sovereignty to provide a backdrop for the legal arguments Wyoming should make to defend the constitutionality of the Act.
17

A. The Wyoming Firearms Freedom Act Versus Existing Federal Law
The major components of existing federal firearms regulation relevant to the Wyoming Firearms Freedom Act are the Gun Control Act of 1968, which amended the Federal Firearms Act of 1938, and the National Firearms Act of 1934. 18 Most importantly, no person under federal law may engage in the business of manufacturing or selling firearms unless licensed by the federal government, irrespective of whether the business occurs inter-or intrastate. 19 Federal law requires all interstate transfers of firearms to occur between federally licensed dealers, restricts the types of firearms a nonresident of a state may purchase, and mandates manufacturers and dealers to record the identity of purchasers. 20 Federal law also restricts the types of firearms that may be possessed by requiring 12 See infra notes 142-223 and accompanying text. 13 See infra notes 224-49 and accompanying text. 14 See infra notes 18-30 and accompanying text. 15 See infra notes 31-60 and accompanying text. 16 See infra notes 61-104 and accompanying text. 17 See infra notes 105-31 and accompanying text. 18 Compare Wyo. stat. ann. § § 6-8-401 to -406 (2010) , with Gun Control Act of 1968, 18 U.S.C. § § 921-931 (2006) (restricting the ability to sell firearms to registered Federal Firearms Licensees (FFLs), requiring interstate purchases and transfers of firearms to occur through FFLs, and requiring retail purchasers and interstate transferees to register their purchases with the federal government) (amending Federal Firearms Act of 1938, Pub. L. No. 75-785, 52 Stat. 1250), and National Firearms Act of 1934, 26 U.S.C. § § 5801-5872 (2006) (requiring the registration and taxation of the sale of short-barreled rifles, short-barreled shotguns, and silencers). 19 18 U.S.C. § 923. 20 Id. § 922(a)(1), (b)(3), (5), (m).
Act holds federal agents criminally liable for enforcing contrary federal law.
29
Wyoming also calls upon-but does not require-the state attorney general to defend Wyoming citizens against such federal action.
30
B. The Political Doctrines of Interposition and Nullification
A constitutional principle that has caused extraordinary confusion and debate over two centuries is federalism. 31 Federalism is the division of authority between the state governments and the national government to act as agents for the ultimate sovereign, the people of the United States. 32 At the founding of the country, political thinkers who desired a strong national government engaged in extraordinary debates with thinkers who embraced a theory of states' rights. 33 29 Wyo. stat. ann. § 6-8-405(b) . In particular, Any official, agent or employee of the United States government who enforces or attempts to enforce any act, order, law, statute, rule or regulation of the United States government upon a personal firearm, a firearm accessory or ammunition manufactured commercially or privately in Wyoming and that remains exclusively within the borders of Wyoming shall be guilty of a misdemeanor and, upon conviction, shall be subject to imprisonment for not more than one (1) year, a fine of not more than two thousand dollars ($2,000.00), or both.
Id.
30 Id. § 6-8-405(c). Specifically,
The attorney general may defend a citizen of Wyoming who is prosecuted by the United States government for violation of a federal law relating to the manufacture, sale, transfer or possession of a firearm, a firearm accessory or ammunition manufactured and retained exclusively within the borders of Wyoming. Nationalists vied for a national government with broad power while states' rights theorists believed the Constitution created a federal government with few, narrowly defined powers. 34 Nationalists desired to form a union led by a highly potent and supreme general government. 35 States' rights theorists believed the states had formed the general government by agreement and therefore retained sovereignty greater than, or at least equal to, that of the general government. 36 The debates over sovereignty and federalism from the time of the founding of the United States have often created a strong political tension. 37 Both nationalists and states' rights theorists agreed unconstitutional laws, federal or state, were void. 38 States' rights theorists, however, including Thomas Jefferson, held states had the right and duty to nullify unconstitutional federal law on the premise that the states were the real check on federal power. 39 Predicating this theory was the notion that the constitution was a compact between statesan agreement made freely between independent sovereigns. 40 Each state, as a party to the compact, had a right and duty to interpret and enforce the compact's terms. 41 According to this theory, the federal government was supposed to be the states' agent for administering the terms of the compact-not above them in ultimate power. 42 The compact theory also rejected the notion that the United States Supreme Court, a federal entity, could be an exclusive, unbiased, or final judge of the extent of federal authority. 43 Rather, the compact theory entitled the states to judge for themselves what was an overreaching of power by the federal government and to act accordingly, precisely because there was no other unbiased judge. 44 Proponents of the notion that states should judge the scope of federal authority and nullify federal actions beyond that scope believed this was the final method, short of bloodshed, for states to protect their sovereignty from an illegitimate exercise of federal power. 45 The Kentucky Resolutions, secretly authored by Thomas Jefferson, and the Virginia Resolutions, anonymously authored by James Madison, were among the first expressions of the right of states to nullify unconstitutional federal law. 46 Jefferson and Madison wrote the Resolutions in response to the passage of the Alien and Sedition Acts. 47 Federalists, fearful of the infiltration of French spies during a minor undeclared naval war, passed the Alien Laws to make immigration more difficult and deportation easier. 48 They passed the Sedition Act to criminally prohibit criticism of the Federalist-controlled national government. 49 Believing the Alien and Sedition Acts to be unconstitutional, Jefferson and Madison espoused the doctrines of nullification and interposition as appropriate state responses to federal overreaching.
31
50
Interposition and nullification, often interchanged for one another, are not precisely the same doctrine. 51 Interposition is a proactive but ideally temporary stance by a state, which places its sovereignty between the federal government and its citizens, promising to void a federal law until the constitutionality of 44 Woods, supra note 31, at 3-7. 45 See id. at 3-7, 84 (describing nullification and distinguishing it from armed conflict). 46 the federal law is resolved. 52 Nullification disregards the need to seek external or further resolution of the conflict. 53 Specifically, Jefferson reasoned the federal government, as a creation of the states, could not be the arbiter of its own power. 54 Jefferson argued each state retained the right to judge the boundaries of federal power and concluded nullification was the "rightful remedy" when the federal government crossed those boundaries. 55 Madison, principal author of the Constitution, expressed a more moderate view than Jefferson. 56 compromise between the nationalist and states' rights compact theories. 57 In the Virginia Resolutions of 1798, Madison wrote that the states "have the right, and are in duty bound, to interpose for arresting the progress of the evil and for maintaining within their respective limits, the authorities, rights and liberties appertaining to them." 58 It appears Madison did not approve of outright nullification of federal law, believing it would disrupt proper government, even while his friend Jefferson espoused it expressly. 59 Madison held to the idea that the composite nature of the Constitution required a softer measure-interposition.
60
C. The Historical Development and Meaning of the Tenth Amendment
How does a sovereign state properly determine when the federal government has overreached constitutional limits? The United States Constitution, as written, is incomplete and often ambiguous. 61 In some cases, the framers of the Constitution 57 the federalIst no. 39 (James Madison). Madison wrote,
The proposed Constitution, therefore, is, in strictness, neither a national nor a federal Constitution, but a composition of both. In its foundation it is federal, not national; in the sources from which the ordinary powers of the government are drawn, it is partly federal and partly national; in the operation of these powers, it is national, not federal; in the extent of them, again, it is federal, not national; and, finally, in the authoritative mode of introducing amendments, it is neither wholly federal nor wholly national.
Id.; see Sprick, supra note 32, at 539 (describing The Federalist's commentary on American federalism); see also Lash, supra note 34, at 1951 ("There was, however, a middle way between the extremes of wholly nationalist and wholly localist . . . readings of the Constitution."). 58 The Virginia Resolutions, supra note 50, at 528 (emphasis added). 59 Whittington, supra note 6, at 15. Madison opposed both the federal Alien and Sedition Acts and the later Southern nullification movements as violative of "the Constitution's balance of federal and state authority." Lash, supra note 34, at 1952-53. 60 Whittington, supra note 6, at 15. Madison, while denying the constitutionality of nullification outright, believed the system of government under the Constitution often would require interposition by the states. Id. Thus, the Virginia Resolutions use the word "interpose" instead of "nullification," which Jefferson employed in the Kentucky Resolutions. See id. In fact, interposition was a political tool commonly employed by states after the end of the Revolutionary War. Hoke, supra note 43, at 860-61. Ironically, six years after the Alien and Sedition Acts expired, the Federalists asserted the doctrine of interposition against federal embargoes, which were harming the interests of New England states. John Bach McMaster, A Century of Constitutional Interpretation, the Century Illustrated monthly magazIne, Apr. 1889, at 870; see Embargo Act of 1807, 2 Stat. 451. The Federalists claimed the embargoes were outside the scope of Congress's power and "oppressive, unconstitutional, null, and void." McMaster, supra, at 870. The federal government responded by enacting another law in 1809 that granted even more power to the Executive. Id.
("Since the days of the Alien and Sedition laws power so vast had never been bestowed on the President."); see Non-Intercourse Act, 2 Stat. 528 (1809). In a furor, Connecticut, Delaware, Maine, and Massachusetts interposed "'to dash in pieces the shackles of tyranny'" by denouncing the federal laws as "repugnant to the true intent and meaning of the Constitution. purposefully equivocated its language to foreclose endless argument they could not otherwise resolve. 62 In other cases, the ambiguity was unintentional. 63 Each generation, therefore, must contend with the meaning of the Constitution, because it is not perfectly coherent. 64 Constitutional interpretation requires extrinsic analysis of other historical writings as well as analysis of the document's development in contrast to "alternative political traditions."
65 This is true in large part because the founding fathers did not agree about issues of governance. 66 They held drastically differing views on fundamental principles, especially federalism. 67 Modern historical accounts of the dialectic between the Founders regarding federalism describe the arguments about the language of the Tenth Amendment as a battle of sorts between the Federalists and the Anti-Federalists. 68 The Federalists it requires analyses of state constitutions to inform its meaning, has no definition of citizenship, is amendable, and is only part of the collective foundational "text" of the "American political system," which also includes the Declaration of Independence); see Sanford Levinson, The Embarrassing Second Amendment, 99 yale l.J. 637, 643-44 (1989) ("No one has ever described the Constitution as a marvel of clarity."). 62 Lutz, supra note 61, at 28. Even the mere fact that the Constitution is amendable demonstrates the framers did not intend it to be an integrated document. Id. at 32 ("The Constitution is incomplete, therefore, because it was looked upon as an experiment that needed careful control and some means for future adjustment. The provision of an amendment process is one clear manifestation of this perspective."); see u.s. Const. art. V (specifying the Constitution's amendment process). 63 Lutz, supra note 61, at 28. 64 Cornell, supra note 31, at 887; see Whittington, supra note 6, at 1-2 (noting political considerations provide a way to interpret the Constitution). 65 Whittington, supra note 6, at 23. Extrinsic factors necessary to understand the Constitution include the principles the ratifiers of the Constitution intended to govern the United States and the political traditions informing the beliefs and decisions of the framers and ratifiers. favored the adoption of the new Constitution as the supreme expression of government in the newly founded United States. 69 The Anti-Federalists preferred the then-existing confederacy. 70 The Anti-Federalists opposed the Constitution, because they anticipated the document's ambiguity would allow the national government to gradually accrue unlimited power to the detriment of the states.
71
In order to assuage the Anti-Federalists whose skepticism of the Constitution threatened to disrupt and prevent its ratification, the Federalists conceded to amend the document with the Bill of Rights as a compromise to assure the Constitution's acceptance. 72 The Bill of Rights included a final amendment, now known as the Tenth Amendment, which states, "The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people."
73 Importantly, the ratified text of the Amendment did not include the word "expressly" as a modifier to the powers delegated to the federal government. 74 This was significant, because the omission of the word "expressly" became the basis for the classic view of federalism as embodied In McCulloch, Marshall, a nationalist, deftly rejected the position of states' rights theorists that the Constitution limited the federal government to expressly enumerated powers. 76 According to McCulloch, the Constitution granted implied powers to Congress so it could practicably act under its express authority. 77 States could not constitutionally impede congressional action merely because Congress acted pursuant to implied power. 78 Marshall opined the omission of the word "expressly" as a descriptor of the federal delegated powers signified the Constitution imbued the federal government with very broad authority. 79 Marshall reasoned the states had impliedly surrendered authority by ratifying the Constitution and that the exercise of federal power "required not the affirmance, and could not be negatived, by the State Governments." 80 This became the orthodox view of federalism. 81 76 17 U.S. at 406 ("But there is no phrase in the instrument which, like the Articles of Confederation, excludes incidental or implied powers and which requires that everything granted shall be expressly and minutely described."); see dIlorenzo, supra note 34, at 78-98 (explicating John Marshall's nationalism); Hoke, supra note 43, at 836 (stating that it is uncontroversial to call Marshall a nationalist and describing McCulloch as conclusive evidence of his nationalism); Lash, supra note 34, at 1890 ("Courts and the legal academy both generally agree that early efforts to limit the federal government to only 'expressly' delegated powers were decisively rebuffed by Chief Justice John Marshall in McCulloch v. Maryland.").
77 17 U.S. at 406. 78 Id. at 406, 426-37. 79 Id. at 406. The opinion reads, But there is no phrase which . . . excludes incidental or implied powers and which requires that everything granted shall be expressly and minutely described. Even the 10th Amendment, which was framed for the purpose of quieting the excessive jealousies which had been excited, omits the word "expressly," and declares only that the powers "not delegated to the United States, nor prohibited to the States, are reserved to the States or to the people," thus leaving the question whether the particular power which may become the subject of contest has been delegated to the one Government, or prohibited to the other, to depend on a fair construction of the whole instrument. [T]he power to regulate . . . to prescribe the rule by which commerce is to be governed . . . . like all others vested in Congress, is complete in itself, may be exercised to its utmost extent, and acknowledges no limitations, other than are prescribed in the Constitution. . . . If, as has always been understood, the sovereignty of Congress, though limited to specified objects, is plenary as to those objects, the power over commerce . . . among the several States, is vested in Congress as absolutely as it would be in a single government.
Id. (emphasis added). The Supreme Court later expanded this view of federal power in
Id. The regulated commerce in question had to be interstate or merely "necessary . . . for the purpose of executing some of the general powers of the government" for Congress's plenary power to take hold.
Id. at 195 (emphasis added)
. 80 McCulloch, 17 U.S. at 404.
In view of McCulloch, the Anti-Federalists demonstrated tremendous prescience when they first asserted that gradually more expansive judicial interpretations would dramatically increase federal power. 82 Given this fear (which later came to fruition), securing a countervailing clause in the Constitution reserving power to the states was of paramount importance to them. 83 While some Anti-Federalists never relented in their opposition to the Constitution, the ones who did would not have done so unless they believed the Bill of Rights contained an effectual limitation on federal power. 84 Yet, the Anti-Federalists were satisfied with the Bill of Rights even though the Tenth Amendment did not explicitly limit the national government to expressly delegated powers.
85
Before McCulloch-even before James Madison wrote the Bill of RightsFederalists such as Samuel Chase, Charles Pinckney, and Alexander Hamilton vocally supported a view of the Constitution that the document would limit Congress to expressly delegated powers. 86 While they did not deny Congress would have some implied powers, Federalists promised those powers would be limited to only the authority truly necessary for Congress to act according to its opined by Marshall in McCulloch v. Maryland as mainstream); Soifer, supra note 32, at 797 (claiming there is no historical basis for constitutional limitation on congressional power). 82 See the antI-federalIst PaPers, supra note 33, at 308 ("Perhaps nothing could have been better conceived to facilitate the abolition of the state governments than the constitution of the judicial. They will be able to extend the limits of the general government gradually, and by insensible degrees, and to accommodate themselves to the temper of the people."); gordon s. Wood, the CreatIon of the amerICan rePuBlIC, 1776-1787, at 471 (1969) (describing the transition from the Articles of Confederation to the Constitution as "a virtual revolution in American politics . . . a serious weakening, if not a destruction, of the power of the states"). 83 Lash, supra note 34, at 1915-16 ("Even if the Federalists could be taken at their word . . . declarations making this principle explicit ought to be adopted, if only for 'greater caution.'"). 84 Id. at 1915 ("Others, however, were open to being persuaded to be in favor of the Constitution, provided that certain safeguards were put in place."). 85 Id. hatever is not expressly given to the federal head, is reserved to the members."); Lash, supra note 34, at 1892 ("Federalist Charles Pinckney insisted that 'no powers could be executed or assumed [by the federal government], but such as were expressly delegated.'"). But see dIlorenzo, supra note 34, at 20 (describing how, before ratification, Hamilton "constantly sought" to assuage states' rights theorists that state sovereignty would remain intact under the Constitution, yet how he, after ratification, worked to destroy state sovereignty); alexander hamIlton, Final Version of an Opinion on the Constitutionality of an Act to Establish a Bank, reprinted in 8 the PaPers of alexander hamIlton, supra, at 97, 98-101 (repudiating the arguments he previously made during ratification and asserting that "every power vested in a Government is in its nature sovereign, and includes by force of the term, a right to employ all the means requisite, and fairly applicable to the attainment of the ends of such power"). enumerated powers. 87 Madison believed the Tenth Amendment simply confirmed the principle that the federal government was limited to an express delegation of power. 88 Madison, primary author of the Amendment, clearly believed the federal government had "few and defined" powers, leaving the infinite remainder to the states. 89 Yet, he did not add "expressly" to the text of the Tenth Amendment, because he was concerned the addition would prompt later readers to compare the Amendment to Article II of the Articles of Confederation and interpret the power of the federal government accordingly. 90 Madison believed the word "expressly" in the Articles of Confederation-very narrowly construed by the states-prevented the federal government from exercising any implied powers, even ones trivially necessary to effect the explicit mandates of the Articles. 91 He believed the word "expressly" rendered the document powerless to solve pressing problems that affected the states as a whole. 92 The Federalists had undertaken to write a new foundational governing document to replace the Articles of Confederation, precisely because they viewed the Articles as ineffectual. 93 Madison was anxious to avoid a legal comparison between the Constitution's would-be narrow definition of federal authority and the hamstrung nature of federal power under the Confederation.
94
While Madison opposed the inclusion of the word "expressly" in the language of the Tenth Amendment, he explicitly agreed with the inclusion of the phrase "or to the people" at the end of the Amendment. 95 This was significant at the time, because many of the nation's founders believed in a political theory of agency that the sovereign (the principal) retained any power it did not expressly relinquish to its agents. 96 The phrase "or to the people" thus represented a binding expression of ultimate popular sovereignty, implying that the people retained all power they did not expressly grant to their agents, the federal and state governments. 97 By further implication, the states as sovereigns retained all power they did not expressly grant to their agent, the federal government. 98 In fact, before the close of the Virginia Ratifying Convention, Madison insisted the federal government would be limited to "expressly delegated power" even though he had excised the word "expressly" from the Tenth Amendment. 99 He later explicitly reiterated this opinion in a famous speech opposing the creation of a national bank. 100 106 In Lopez, the Court examined the Gun-Free School Zones Act of 1990 (GFSZA) after the federal government convicted a high school senior under the GFSZA for carrying a .38 caliber revolver onto school property. 107 The defendant moved to dismiss the criminal action as "beyond the power of Congress to legislate control over our public schools." 108 The district court denied the motion, opining Congress had a "well-defined power to regulate activities in and affecting commerce, and the 'business' of elementary, middle and high schools . . . affects interstate commerce."
109
The Court examined the constitutionality of the GFSZA first by noting the federal government is one of "enumerated powers. 109 Id. at 551-52. 110 Id. at 552. 111 Id. (quoting the federalIst no. 45 (James Madison)). 112 Id. at 553. The Court stated the commerce power "is the power to regulate; that is, to prescribe the rule by which commerce is to be governed. This power, like all others vested in [C]ongress, is complete in itself, may be exercised to its utmost extent, and acknowledges no limitations, other than are prescribed in the constitution." Id. concerned more than one state but also that wholly intrastate activity was not in Congress's purview to regulate.
113
The Lopez Court then surveyed the history of Commerce Clause-Tenth Amendment jurisprudence and determined even the most deferential opinions in the case law subjected the Commerce Clause to "outer limits." 114 The Court stated Commerce Clause action must bear a "substantial relation to commerce," and defined three categories of activity Congress has authority to regulate under the Commerce Clause.
115 It decided Congress may regulate "the channels of interstate commerce," "the instrumentalities of interstate commerce," and "activities that substantially affect interstate commerce."
116 The Court quickly dispensed with any connection the GFSZA may have had to the channels or instrumentalities of interstate commerce, as those criteria relate to the modes and manners of actual transportation between states.
117 It then analyzed the GFSZA under the third category, determining whether the activity regulated by the GFSZA substantially affected interstate commerce.
118
The Court reiterated that Congress's power to regulate economic activity was very broad, so long as the activity substantially affected interstate commerce. 119 Notably, the Court reaffirmed Congress had a legitimate power to regulate various commercial intrastate activities. 120 The Lopez Court, however, opined that even the broadest interpretation of federal commerce power in case law, the regulation of the production of homegrown home-consumed wheat under Wickard v. Filburn, contemplated actual economic activity whereas "possession of a gun in a school zone does not."
121 Noting the GFSZA was a criminal statute having no relation to 113 "any sort of economic enterprise," the Court also observed the GFSZA was not part of a larger "regulatory scheme" which required federal control of intrastate activity to preserve the scheme's integrity. 122 Thus, the Court held the GFSZA did not substantially affect interstate commerce.
123
Lopez also stressed the need for a "jurisdictional element" in the statute that would allow the Court to evaluate whether the possession of a firearm in violation of the GFSZA affected interstate commerce. 124 The Court observed the GFSZA did not explicitly specify a commerce element in any of the delineated crimes.
125
The Court strongly suggested Congress should employ an express jurisdictional element limiting the purview of criminal statutes to crimes concerning interstate commerce for such laws to withstand the scrutiny of the "substantially affects" category.
126
Nevertheless, if the text of the statute did not make the relationship to interstate commerce plain on its face, the Court indicated it was Congress's burden to demonstrate through findings that an activity substantially affected interstate commerce. 127 The Court did not require Congress to make formal findings as a prerequisite to legislation but stated such findings would have helped it evaluate Congress's judgment that guns in school zones had substantially affected interstate commerce.
128
Finally, the Court noted it unlikely that the commerce power was ever unlimited in areas traditionally governed by states, such as education or criminal law enforcement "where States historically have been sovereign."
129 Justice Kennedy's concurrence reinforced the notion that the Court would evaluate whether congressional activity impinged on areas of "traditional state concern" in future review of federal statutes. 130 The Court struck down the GFSZA as 122 Id. at 561. 123 Id. 124 Id. As an example of what the Court was describing, it cited United States v. Bass, in which the Court reviewed a statute that had made it a crime for a convicted felon to "receive, possess, or transport" a firearm "in commerce or affecting commerce." Id. at 561-62 (quoting 404 U.S. 336, 337 (1971)). The Lopez Court noted Bass had imputed the additional jurisdictional element that the commerce must be interstate for the criminal prosecution to be valid. Id. at 562. 125 Id. 126 See id. ("Unlike the statute in Bass, [the GFSZA] has no express jurisdictional element which might limit its reach to a discrete set of firearm possessions that additionally have an explicit connection with or effect on interstate commerce."). 127 Id. at 562-63. 128 Id.
129 Id. at 564. 130 See id. at 577 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (noting that "[w]ere the Federal Government to take over the regulation of entire areas of traditional state concern, areas having nothing to do with the regulation of commercial activities, the boundaries between the spheres of federal and state authority would blur and political responsibility would become illusory"). exceeding Congress's authority to regulate commerce because it did not clearly regulate a commercial activity or establish interstate commerce as an element of the specified crime.
131
III. analysIs
This analysis supports two theses. First, the enactment of the Wyoming Firearms Freedom Act was a constitutional exercise of state power, according to current federal jurisprudence and a historical understanding of state sovereignty under the Tenth Amendment.
132 Second, Wyoming is constitutionally right to interpose between its citizens and the federal government under the Act and the Tenth Amendment. 133 This analysis initially addresses the legal arguments Wyoming should make to judicially interpose between its citizens and the federal government when it finds itself haled into federal court. 134 Wyoming should assert the unconstitutionality of current federal firearms law under United States v. Lopez. 135 Wyoming should also assert the constitutionality of the Act according to an unorthodox but historically tenable view of state sovereignty: the framers and ratifiers of the Tenth Amendment intended to restrict federal authority to a narrow range of power. 136 Wyoming nonetheless faces a significant obstacle: the Supreme Court has held the opposite view for nearly two-hundred years. 137 Moreover, because Wyoming faces a very high bar to convince the federal judiciary that stare decisis should not control its interpretation of the Tenth Amendment, Wyoming should use the Amendment's historically intended meaning for justification in the political process. 138 Relatedly, Wyoming must actively engage in political interposition between its citizens and the federal government with a combination of patience with, and active resistance to, federal power. 139 It must wait for the federal government to relent, which is fairly likely based on the federal response to state interposition on other issues. 140 Wyoming also must actively pressure the government to relent by carrying out the legislative enforcement directives of the Act.
A. A Legal Analysis of the Wyoming Firearms Freedom Act Vis-à-vis Federal Jurisprudence
The Wyoming Firearms Freedom Act requires Wyoming to arrest federal agents for enforcing federal law. 142 The provisions also encourage the state to defend in court its citizens charged with violating extant federal law. 143 The Act declares that Wyoming retains exclusive power over intrastate firearms regulation within its borders and that federal law over this area with respect to Wyoming's citizens is void. 144 Thus, Wyoming will appear in court either when the federal government sues the state for arresting its agents or when Wyoming defends its citizens in federal prosecutions. 145 Federal jurisprudence and critics of a narrow interpretation of federal power under the Tenth Amendment usually cite the Supremacy Clause as prohibiting state law that directly conflicts with existing federal law. 146 The Supremacy Clause, however, suffers from the ambiguity that pervades the Constitution, because its language simply begs the question as to what actually is supreme law. 147 The Supremacy Clause states, "This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof . . . shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding." 148 The heart of the ambiguity lies in the phrase "in [p]ursuance thereof," because it circularly 142 Wyo. stat. ann. § 6-8-405(b) (2010). 143 Id. § 6-8-405(c). 144 Id. § 6-8-404(a). 145 See id. § 6-8-405(b)-(c) (making it a misdemeanor for federal agents to enforce federal law in conflict with the Act and calling upon the Wyoming Attorney General to defend Wyoming citizens against federal prosecution); see also states the Constitution and constitutional federal law is supreme. 149 The crux of state interposition (or nullification) lies in that ambiguity: Jefferson, Madison, and others argued that states themselves had the duty and the right to void unconstitutional federal law. 150 Federal law must be made in pursuance of the Constitution's meaning for it to have any weight at all.
151 Accordingly, the main thrust of any argument Wyoming raises before the federal judiciary must be that the federal law in conflict with the Act is illegal and void. 152 The current view of the Supreme Court under United States v. Lopez does place some judicial limits on Congress's Commerce Clause power. 153 First, when Wyoming contends federal gun control law is illegal, the Supreme Court is likely to evaluate whether the federal statute in question addresses one of the three 149 Woods, supra note 31, at 14; Hoke, supra note 43, at 845 ("The one threshold that national law must traverse on the way to obtaining the brass ring of supremacy is that the law in question must be 'in Pursuance of,' or consistent with, the Constitution."). 150 The Kentucky Resolutions, supra note 50, at 540, 545; The Virginia Resolutions, supra note 50, 528-29; Woods, supra note 31, at 14; see id. at 3-4 ("If the federal government has the exclusive right to judge the extent of its own powers, warned James Madison and Thomas Jefferson in 1798, it will continue to grow-regardless of . . . much-touted limits on government power."); Pursley, supra note 31, at 948 ("Nor is a plenary power of preemption a necessary feature of the government's federal structure."); see also Gray, supra note 40, at 162 (arguing the plain language in the Supremacy Clause, "and the judges in every state shall be bound thereby," only binds state judiciaries and not state executives or legislatures). But see Brutus, Second Essay Opposing the Constitution, reprinted in deClarIng rIghts: a BrIef hIstory WIth doCuments 126, 131 (Jack N. Rakove ed., 1997) (anticipating the Supremacy Clause would prevent state limitation of exercises of federal power). 151 Hoke, supra note 43, at 845, 850-53 (noting the phrase "in Pursuance" is a limit on federal power and examining the ambiguity inherent in the phrase "to the Contrary" Presuming the Court follows Lopez, it must determine whether the law addresses the use of channels of interstate commerce, the instrumentalities of interstate commerce, or activities that substantially affect interstate commerce.
155
Just as the Court summarily disposed of the notion that the GFSZA had anything to do with the channels or instrumentalities of interstate commerce, Wyoming should argue federal firearms laws such as the National Firearms Act of 1934 (NFA) and the Gun Control Act of 1968 (GCA) also do not contemplate either Lopez category. 156 The parts of the federal firearms statutes in conflict with the Wyoming Firearms Freedom Act simply do not directly regulate the routes by which goods are shipped or transmitted from one party to another or the methods by which those goods are carried. 157 Additionally, these statutes do not concern potential sources of direct harm to the instrumentalities of interstate commerce, e.g., airplanes, trains, trucks, ships, automobiles, and the internet. 154 514 U.S. at 558-59; see Weis, supra note 152, at 1445-62 (discussing how the federal judiciary applies the three Lopez categories).
155 514 U.S. at 558-59. 156 See id. at 559 (dispensing with an analysis of the GFSZA under the instrumentalities and channels categories). In such a case, Wyoming should argue that because Lopez did not warrant a channels or instrumentalities analysis of criminal firearms regulation, such an analysis for other federal firearms legislation is also inappropriate. See id.; see also Lauricella, supra note 65, at 1402-06 (arguing the Commerce Clause was always supposed to be narrowly construed). 157 See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 559 (noting the GFSZA did not regulate "the use of the channels of interstate commerce"). Since the Wyoming Firearms Freedom Act only contemplates firearms made and retained inside Wyoming, a discussion of the effects of firearms on channels or instrumentalities, which only exist when transport happens across state lines, appears to be moot. See id. On the other hand, some justices may elastically opine since the subject matter of the federal firearms legislation regards dangerous items, such items, having the potential to harm the instrumentalities of commerce while they are in transit, are properly regulated. See id. at 565 ("Justice Breyer focuses . . . on the threat that firearm possession in and near schools poses to the . . . potential economic consequences flowing from the threat."); see also Weis, supra note 152, at 1445-47 (examining how lower courts have avoided striking down federal criminal statutes with questionable constitutionality by manipulating the Lopez categories). But see Lopez, 514 U.S. at 559 (refuting Justice Breyer's dissent by noting his analysis would errantly subsume areas clearly outside the scope of federal law). 158 See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 559 (noting the GFSZA did not seek to "protect an instrumentality of interstate commerce"); Brandon P. By elimination, the only applicable analysis is whether federal gun control legislation substantially affects interstate commerce, and Wyoming should argue federal regulation of intrastate firearms is unconstitutional under this third Lopez category. 159 According to Lopez, the Court must examine whether federal legislation applies to commercial or non-commercial activity. 160 In this inquiry, Wyoming appears to be interposing for its citizens in two ways in the Act:
A personal firearm, a firearm accessory or ammunition that is manufactured commercially or privately in Wyoming and that remains exclusively within the borders of Wyoming is not subject to federal law . . . under the authority of the United States congress to regulate interstate commerce.
161
A firearm cannot exist without being manufactured. Federal gun control law does regulate manufacture of firearms-as well as their interstate commercial transmission-but it also regulates the possession of certain classes of firearms and the possession of firearms by specific classes of persons. 162 Thus, Wyoming's nullifying declaration addresses both the types of firearms Wyoming citizens are allowed to manufacture and the classes of citizens who may possess them. 163 With regard to intrastate manufacturing, Lopez cites Wickard v. Filburn for the clear proposition that the Commerce Clause empowers Congress to regulate the production of goods, even if the goods might only affect markets in aggregate. 164 On its face, Wickard may apply to the manufacture of firearms 159 See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 558-61 (delineating, formalistically, between the three categories of activity Congress may regulate with its commerce power and applying the "substantially affects" category to all other activity not covered by the first two categories); Kirk, 70 F.3d at 801 (Jones, J., dissenting) (criticizing the majority for avoiding analysis of a federal firearms criminal statute under the third Lopez "substantially affects" category); Weis, supra note 152, at 1447 (noting the relevance of the third Lopez category to firearms regulation by discussing how federal circuit courts dubiously avoided analyzing a federal firearms statute under the third Lopez category to uphold the statute). 160 (prohibiting the same classes of persons from possessing firearms that Wyoming precludes as well as prohibiting possession by persons indicted for felonies, fugitives, unlawful users of controlled substances, aliens, dishonorably discharged persons, former citizens, persons subject to restraining orders, and domestic violence misdemeanants). 164 Lopez, 514 U.S. at 556-57 (citing 317 U.S. 111 (1942)) (upholding congressional regulation of the production of an item or commodity even if the producer reserves the item or commodity for personal use or prevents it from crossing state lines).
even if those firearms remain in Wyoming, simply because Congress's power to regulate manufacture is so broad. 165 Deeper analysis, however, requires a look at the purpose of the wheat-growing regulation in Wickard. 166 The Wickard Court recognized the purpose of the regulation was to protect market supply and demand of wheat in aggregate over the whole nation. 167 By contrast, Congress's purpose in enacting extant federal gun control legislation was not to preserve the market pricing, supply, and demand of metal, metal alloys, polymers, sulfur, charcoal, or saltpeter. 168 Rather, Congress's purpose was to prevent crime by regulating concealable rifles, silencers, automatic weapons, and so-called destructive devices.
169 Accordingly, when the Lopez Court described the GFSZA, it noted the subject matter of the law addressed in Wickard actually contemplated economic activity whereas firearm possession near a school does not. 170 In this way, federal gun control legislation bears substantial similarity under Lopez to the GFSZA because Congress did not enact it for a commercial purpose. 171 Thus, federal prohibition of firearm possession by certain classes of persons is arguably not commercial in nature. 172 Desires to curtail crime and protect the 165 See 317 U.S. at 120, 133 (upholding congressional regulation of intrastate production). 166 See id. . 171 See id. at 551, 561 ("The [GFSZA] neither regulates a commercial activity nor contains a requirement that the possession be connected in any way to interstate commerce. . . . Section 922(q) is a criminal statute that by its terms has nothing to do with 'commerce' or any sort of economic enterprise."). But see Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 18-20 (2005) (upholding the Controlled Substances Act, which sought to "control the supply and demand of controlled substances in both lawful and unlawful drug markets" even where the activity in question had nothing to do with buying or selling, because the production of marijuana substantially affected the national market). 172 public from harm may have been sympathetic reasons for Congress's enactment of the GCA and the NFA, but they have little to do with commerce. 173 Wyoming should argue by analogy to the GFSZA that federal firearms law regulating intrastate firearms possession, manufacture, and transfer is non-commercial and, therefore, unconstitutional.
174
The Lopez Court also required the presence of a jurisdictional element in federal statutes specifying their relationship to interstate commerce. 175 The Court looks to see whether a statute expressly provides such an element or whether it can be read into the statute by implication. 176 Wyoming should take the opportunity to argue that many parts of the national firearms statutes do not include the proper interstate commerce jurisdictional element, expressly or impliedly. 177 The GCA does contain a significant number of interstate commerce jurisdictional elements for its prohibitions, but not in all its parts. 178 For instance, the GCA prohibits the sale or transfer of a firearm to someone with a domestic violence conviction. 179 There is no express jurisdictional element mandating such a sale . But see Weis, supra note 152, at 1450 (noting the lack of a legal standard to distinguish between commercial and non-commercial activities). 173 See Silverman, supra note 169, at 485 n.18 (1993) (recognizing the purpose of firearms regulation has been to curtail crime); cf. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 561 (observing the GFSZA had nothing to do with economic enterprise). See generally 18 U.S.C. § § 921-931 (restricting the ability to deal in firearms to registered Federal Firearms Licensees (FFLs), requiring interstate purchases and transfers of firearms to occur through FFLs, and requiring retail purchasers and interstate transferees to register their purchases with the federal government); 26 U.S.C. § § 5801-5872 (requiring the registration and taxation of the sale of short-barreled rifles, short-barreled shotguns, and silencers); 28 C.F.R. § § 25.1-25.57 (2010) (requiring a criminal background check on the purchaser for each retail purchase of a firearm). 174 See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 567 ("The possession of a gun . . . is in no sense an economic activity."). But see Weis, supra note 152, at 1450 (discussing the lack of clear distinction between commercial and non-commercial activity under Lopez).
175 514 U.S at 561. 176 Id. at 561-62. The standard, however, for this requirement is minimal, because if a court finds that a federal statute contains the necessary jurisdictional element, it will not independently evaluate whether the statute substantially affects interstate commerce. Weis, supra note 152, at 1454 (" [T] he mere presence of a jurisdictional element . . . automatically renders a statute constitutional."). 177 See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 561-62 (specifying the need for an interstate commerce jurisdictional element in congressional criminal statutes); United States v. Kirk, 70 F.3d 791, 796 (5th Cir. 1995) (observing the federal statute prohibiting machinegun possession and transfer contained no interstate commerce jurisdictional element); Weis, supra note 152, at 1447-48 (arguing courts should require jurisdictional elements for all three Lopez categories). See generally 18 U.S.C. § § 921-931; 26 U.S.C. § § 5801-5872 (lacking, in many parts, the required interstate commerce jurisdictional element). 178 See generally 18 U.S.C. § § 921-931. or transfer occur in interstate commerce. 180 Meanwhile, the NFA contains few references to interstate commerce but broadly prohibits the manufacture and transfer of certain firearms irrespective of whether the weapons are crossing state lines.
181 Thus, when Wyoming is defending one of its citizens against federal prosecution, if the federal court cannot find sufficient nexus between interstate commerce and the regulation of firearms, Lopez requires the court to dismiss the indictment or set aside a conviction as unconstitutional. 182 Moreover, Wyoming should argue Congress has not explicitly found that most of the activities regulated by the major federal firearms statutes affect interstate commerce. 183 While the Lopez Court did not precisely require Congress to make findings about the statutes it enacts, the Court strongly indicated findings would compensate for the lack of an express jurisdictional element where the commercial nature of the statute was not readily apparent. 184 Only one of the federal firearms regulations contains findings by Congress concerning the activities it regulates. 185 Thus, a federal court cannot readily determine whether Congress believed activities such as intrastate manufacture and possession of firearms bore a substantial relation to interstate commerce and, thus, cannot compensate for the lack of interstate commerce jurisdictional elements in the statutes. 186 Finally, Wyoming should argue federal law regulating intrastate firearms encroaches on an area "where States historically have been sovereign." 187 The
Lopez Court discussed the notion that areas of traditional state concern subject Congress to limits on its commerce power. 188 Lopez noted education and "criminal law enforcement" are two such areas. 189 Congress has broad authority to define and prohibit criminal activity while the Executive enforces federal criminal law daily. 190 Thus, the use of the phrase "criminal law enforcement" in the Lopez concurrence cannot be meant literally and appears to be a euphemism for firearms regulation. 191 Wyoming, thus, has a colorable legal argument that Lopez impliedly leaves intrastate firearms regulation to the states as an area of traditional state concern, rendering federal firearms laws as applied to intrastate activity unconstitutional.
192
Wyoming should also argue the Act is a constitutional exercise of state sovereignty under the Tenth Amendment.
193 A common understanding of Federalists and Anti-Federalists at the time of ratification of the Constitution was that the Tenth Amendment limited the federal government to the exercise of expressly enumerated powers. 194 Unfortunately for Wyoming, the Supreme control of an area of regulation is inappropriate where state laws are the result of state citizens seeking to "have their own social, cultural, and community fabrics" or "maintain a close local hold on local law enforcement functions"). 188 See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 564 ("Under the theories that the Government presents . . . it is difficult to perceive any limitation on federal power, even in areas such as criminal law enforcement or education where States historically have been sovereign."); id. at 580-81 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (discussing "whether the exercise of national power seeks to intrude upon an area of traditional state concern" and positing "[i]n these circumstances, we have a particular duty to ensure that the federal-state balance is not destroyed"). 189 Id. at 564; see Calabresi, supra note 187, at 803 (" [T] here is nothing to be gained and much to be lost from allowing the federal behemoth to get involved in matters as overwhelmingly local in their impact as the ones involved in Lopez."). 190 See Weis, supra note 152, at 1436-38 (discussing the federal government's broad criminal jurisdiction). 191 See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 564 (reiterating state historical sovereignty over "criminal law enforcement"). 192 See id. at 564, 580-81; Calabresi, supra note 187, at 752, 831 (arguing the Supreme Court's proper role is to limit national power and use Lopez to return to a more balanced federalism); Lauricella, supra note 65, at 1380 ("Lopez is a positive case for advocates of stronger state power."). Nevertheless, while Lopez supports the argument that intrastate firearms regulation belongs wholly to the states, the Constitution prohibits the states from infringing upon the rights of the people to keep and bear arms. Respondents . . . use marijuana that has never been bought or sold, that has never crossed state lines, and that has had no demonstrable effect on the national market for marijuana. If Congress can regulate this under the Commerce Clause, then it can regulate virtually anything-and the Federal Government is no longer one of limited and enumerated powers.
Id.
197 Lash, supra note 34, at 1945 (arguing McCulloch transformed the federal government into a government with only "expressly enumerated restrictions" instead of "expressly enumerated powers"). 195 The expansive view of federal power has been accepted as truth for so long that it may be difficult for some to realize the McCulloch interpretation of federalism is a complete inversion of the Tenth Amendment. 196 Regardless whether a federal law actually pertains to an enumerated power of Congress, McCulloch and its progeny allow Congress to use most means to do most things. 197 In Lopez, the Supreme Court returned to a formalistic analysis of, rather than complete deference to, Congress's commerce power.
198 Still, the Court holds to the view that Congress retains enormous "discretion and control over the federal balance" of power. . 202 See Pryor, supra note 200, at 1175 (describing Madison's design for federalism contemplated states exercising sovereignty in all areas not specifically enumerated and granted to the federal government); Pursley, supra note 31, at 917, 951 & n.223 (noting the "prevailing view" is that the federal government and the states should actively participate in the political process and opining judicial intervention is the wrong method for resolving issues of federalism); see also Hoke, supra note 43, at 890 (arguing the remoteness of national government requires a reassessment of how federal power is determined). 203 
B. Nullification and Interposition by Wyoming
The uncertainty of judicial review and the conservatism inherent in stare decisis will likely leave Wyoming where it began when it enacted the Wyoming Firearms Freedom Act: seeking political rather than legal resolution. 201 Especially outside the courtroom, Wyoming should invoke the historical textual argument that the Tenth Amendment reserves vast power to the states. 202 In passing the Act, Wyoming has joined a growing movement of states seeking to restore the full measure of their sovereignty by actively declaring federal power over certain areas of regulation void. 203 pertinent to Wyoming's Act, Alaska, Arizona, Idaho, Montana, South Dakota, Tennessee, and Utah have also enacted laws declaring firearms manufactured and retained within their respective state borders exempt from federal power. 205 All but one of these states rely on assertions of Tenth Amendment authority to invalidate federal intrastate firearms regulation. 206 These states undoubtedly would find the historical arguments that the framers intended the Tenth Amendment to be a strong limitation on federal power compelling for their own political confrontations.
207 213 See Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 29 (2005) (holding federal drug law valid despite the respondent's defense that state law allowed growth and use of marijuana); see also Hoke, supra note 145, at 695-96, 713 (conceiving of states as the proper vehicles of citizen participation with respect to federal policy and criticizing orthodox theories of federalism for attenuating citizen Furthermore, states have forged ahead in efforts to nullify or interpose against other federal law, even without a clear historical argument for their sovereignty under the Tenth Amendment. 208 Fourteen states since 1996 have passed laws allowing for the use and sale of medical marijuana in direct opposition to the federal Controlled Substances Act. 209 Thirteen years after California started the medical marijuana movement, the Department of Justice issued a memorandum directing United States Attorneys not to expend resources on prosecuting marijuana cases in states that had decriminalized the drug for medical use. 210 In these cases, no state legislated a method to protect its citizens from prosecution under-or prescribed active state-level resistance to-federal laws. 211 Instead, it can be said the states passively interposed between the federal government and their citizens simply by legislating law that conflicted with a federal statute. 212 In a way, these acts of legislative defiance appear to have been just enough to encourage citizens to defy the federal government themselves. 213 When a sufficient number of states over a decade and a half began to act in a manner contrary to federal law, the Justice Department gave up enforcement. 214 In 2005, the federal government mandated significant security changes to official identification cards, including state driver licenses, by passing the REAL ID Act of 2005. 215 REAL ID required substantial action by the states, including the collection of significant amounts of private data from citizens. 216 Because of this intrusive mandate, many states have refused to participate in REAL ID. 217 It only took four years from the advent of REAL ID for sixteen states to expressly interpose themselves between their citizens and the federal government on this issue. 218 Instead of merely legalizing certain citizen behavior under state law, the states which oppose REAL ID have proactively prohibited their officials from complying with the federal mandate. 219 The federal government delayed the implementation of REAL ID several times and did so indefinitely at the end of 2009 in apparent capitulation to state pressure. 220 Because of these states' efforts, the willpower of the federal Executive to resist them on certain issues has waned. 221 Therefore, as the movement among states to pass firearms freedom acts continues to grow, Wyoming may observe a decline in federal interest in enforcing firearms law against wholly intrastate activities. 222 Patience may be the virtue necessary for Wyoming to resolve this political dispute in its favor, since it is unknown how long the federal government may take to relent. 223 The difference, however, between the Act and the laws states have passed to interpose in the areas of medical marijuana and identification card security is that the Act threatens to stir up a hornet's nest by authorizing the arrest of federal agents. 224 If Wyoming simply had declared federal law over intrastate firearms void, the Act would have been analogous to the expressly defiant but passive interposition of the states opposing REAL ID. 225 Wyoming's criminalization of the enforcement of conflicting federal law demands the state decide ahead of time what it will do when faced with a serious potential conflict. 226 These things cannot be clearly explained in words. You must research what is written here. In these three ways of forestalling, you must judge the situation. This does not mean that you always attack first; but if the enemy attacks first you can lead him around. In strategy, you have effectively won when you forestall the enemy, so you must train well to attain this. 232 Jahnke v. State, 692 P.2d 911, 929 (Wyo. 1984 ) ("Any decision to initiate criminal proceedings is vested in the prosecuting attorney, and the decision is discretionary.").
Following the current jurisprudence of federal supremacy, the United States District Court of Wyoming is not likely to forebear the arrest of federal agents acting in accordance with existing federal law.
227 Absent a cataclysmic shift by the Supreme Court revoking the broad implied power of Congress, the District Court is likely to issue a writ of habeas corpus to inquire why the agents have been imprisoned. 228 Assuming the court orders the release of the agents, Wyoming must decide in advance whether it will honor the court's writ and release the imprisoned federal agents. 229 If it does not immediately release the prisoners, Wyoming should also determine in advance what it will do when federal marshals show up to demand custody of the prisoners or to arrest Wyoming state officials for contempt of federal court. 230 If Wyoming were to singularly attempt this course of action, it is impossible to predict the outcome. 231 On the other hand, Wyoming could employ its enforcement mechanisms selectively. 232 Instead of escalating to an unknowable resolution, the state should use the enforcement mechanisms sparingly to create precedent over time. 233 While due process after a federal court's order of release may foreclose convictions of federal agents charged with violating the Act, Wyoming still could arrest federal agents to impress upon the federal government how serious it is about its sovereignty. 234 It may be more effective at first, however, for Wyoming to let its enforcement provisions lie as a model for other states to adopt just as Wyoming followed the lead of Montana in adopting the Act. 235 If Wyoming can convince its sister states to amend their acts to include similar enforcement provisions, or convince new states to enact firearms freedom acts, the states in aggregate will become more potent in their resistance to federal law. 236 Even ten or fifteen states threatening to arrest Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives agents for enforcing federal law against intrastate uses of firearms should be enough to give the Department of Justice pause. 237 If Wyoming is longsuffering enough and not too quick to escalate with the federal government, it may effect exactly what its legislature intended by enacting the Wyoming Firearms Freedom Act. 238 Meanwhile, Wyoming should strengthen the Act by adding further mandates and incentives. 239 For instance, Wyoming should require the attorney general to defend citizens against federal firearms prosecution for intrastate activity. 240 In so doing, the state would send the resolute message that it rejects federal power in this area and is willing to defend its populace-citizen by citizen if necessary. 241 To authority, their own duties to uphold and defend the Constitution of the United States and the Wyoming Constitution require decisive and honest action as well as wisdom. 249 
IV. ConClusIon
Although the Wyoming Firearms Freedom Act conflicts with existing federal law, the Act is a constitutionally valid exercise of state power. 250 The Act is a manifestation of the doctrines of interposition and nullification espoused by James Madison and Thomas Jefferson in the early history of the United States. 251 The Act is also a clear exercise of state sovereignty that comports with the historical development of the Tenth Amendment. 252 Furthermore, if Wyoming finds itself haled into federal court because it has enforced the provisions of the Act, the state should employ the framework of United States v. Lopez to argue that existing federal law as applied to intrastate firearms is unconstitutional. 253 Wyoming should also assert the constitutionality of the Act pursuant to the historical meaning of the Tenth Amendment, by which Madison and the other framers intended to restrict federal authority to expressly enumerated powers. 254 Nevertheless, Wyoming faces a significant jurisprudential obstacle. 255 The federal judiciary has held an expansive view of federal power since 1819 and the Supreme Court is unlikely to overturn the broad interpretation of federal power under McCulloch v. Maryland. 256 Thus, Wyoming ought to use the historical argument that the Tenth Amendment reserved substantial sovereignty to the states as justification for its actions in the political process. 257 To that end, Wyoming
